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Abstract
The paper investigates the e!ect of interest policy on price 1u11les,
trading 1ehavior and portfolio choice in e5perimental stock markets. 4
series of e5periments has 8 participants trade an asset over "5 periods.
4lternatively, the participants can invest money in interest-1earing 1onds.
Treatment groups are su1Mected to an endogenous interest policy, Nhile
control groups e5perience a constant interest rate. Our stock markets are
characteriPed 1y 1u11les. While Ne o1serve a small positive impact of
our interest policy on 1u11les, the policy also strongly increases market
volatility. On the other hand, concerning portfolio choice, Ne nd evidence
for value-driven QrationalR investment 1ehavior.
!The authors gratefully acknoNledge feed1ack and comments from seminar participants at
the University of Zurich, StanfordSs :raduate School of Business, the SNiss National Bank, the
University of >rankfurt, Bergen Business School, and of several traders of the >i5ed Income
:roup of :oldman Sachs UondonV most nota1ly of Wriss Ben-Brahim, Fon Bendor, Feremy
BuloN, Ernst >ehr, Xhip Heath, Tunay Tunca, Bo1 Wilson, and Muhamet ZildiP.
"
1 Introduction, literature review, and new ques-
tions
>or much of the last [uarter of the 20th century, it has not 1een en vogue to
1e an intervening macroeconomist - 1oth the monetarist revolution and the e#-
cient market hypothesis Qcom1ined Nith rational e5pectationsR appear to advice
against interventions of central 1anks. :radually, this has 1een put into [ues-
tion, most nota1ly after the discovery of Se5cess volatilityS Qan e5tent of volatility
on real stock markets that cannot 1e e5plained 1y standard economic models
QShiller Q"98"RRR. Su1se[uently, economic theory 1egan to consider alternative
approaches to understanding nancial markets, such as 1ehavorial models. Re-
cent macroeconomic e5perience Qe.g., the 4sian market crisis in "99\R as Nell
as neN theoretical approaches to the analysis of nancial markets accelerated a
change in attitude, and renegade macroeconomists have gone even further and
1egun to talk of ]the return of depression economics] QKrugman Q"999RR.
4lan :reenspan, chairman of the >ederal Reserve Board Q>edR, highly visi1le
and inuential in central 1ank policy, has long 1een a moderating voice - his
opinion that markets overreacted and shoNed signs of ]irrational e5u1erance]
1ecame almost prover1ial. 4lthough originally at times ridiculed, this point of
vieN has found validation over the course of the year 2000. Using an active
interest rate policy, the >ed tried to engineer a Ssoft landingS of the economy,
in particular of stock markets - a macroeconomic e5periment on a grand scale.
One of our motivations Nas to try to e5tract the essence of such a real Norld
e5periment and test it in a la1oratory setting. 4t the very least, this is less
costly and less risky, and might still give some feed1ack on hoN several important
policy varia1les interrelate.
Our e5periment naturally e5tends a tradition of la1oratory stock market e5-
periments. 4 typical la1oratory stock market has the folloNing structure. Si5 to
eight traders interact Nith each other using some electronic trading system over
"2 or "5 periods. Trade takes usually place using a continuous dou1le auction,
the traded asset is a stock that pays a dividend at the end of each period, and
the dividend is mildly stochastic and stationary over time. In such a market, the
fundamental value of the asset e[uals the product of the num1er of remaining
periods times the e5pected value of the dividend draN. Traders 1egin the e5per-
iment Nith an endoNment in stock and some e5perimental currency that Nill 1e
e5changed at the end of all trading into dollars at a pre-specied rate. 4ll this is
common information. 4lthough it is knoNn that common information does not
necessarily imply common knoNledge 1ecause priors possi1ly di!er, economic
theory Nould still typically predict trading at or near the fundamental value of
the stock - or no trade at all, 1ecause on a group level this is a Pero sum game.
Wespite all this, la1oratory trading deviates in a S1u11leS pattern from fun-
damental value. The folloNing styliPed facts characteriPe a typical e5perimental
stock market 1u11le Qcompare gure _R. Trade in early periods tends to 1e
close to fundamental value, not infre[uently even under it. People then 1id the
stock price up and eventually trade at prices that are signicantly higher than
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the fundamental value - until a certain point in time Qhere a1out period "0 or
""R after Nhich the stock price 1egins to crum1le, sometimes in outright crashes
Qfast decline in price at high trading volumeR.
Naturally, economists are puPPleda SrationalS people Nould not do this Qe.g.
Tirole Q"982RR. 4 possi1le e5planation is the Sgreater fool theoryS Qor KeynesS
S1eauty contestSR - even if you are aNare of the inherent value of an o1Mect, you
are rationally Nilling to pay more as long as you 1elieve that you Nill nd another
trader to 1uy the asset from you at an even higher and even less SrationalS price,
1e that 1ecause she is a rookie or 1ecause she speculates even more aggressively.
Until a short Nhile ago, this Nas the hope that drove regular people, often
rookies, to [uitting their Mo1s in order to pursue full-time momentum trading
Qday tradingR.
This e5planation has already 1een proposed 1y the authors of the seminal
paper in the literature QSmith, Suchanek, Williams Q"988RR. It is all the more
surprising that Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"R have de1unked very convincingly the
speculation motive as a sole source of la1oratory stock market 1u11les. Briey,
they created a stock market structure that prevented speculation, and o1served
very little e!ect on any 1u11le measure.
Other papers have investigated the sta1ility of the o1served phenomenon
Nith regard to di!erent treatment parameters. King, Smith, Williams, van
Boening Q"99_R shoN that neither of the folloNing have an impact on the oc-
curance or siPe of 1u11lesa the possi1ility to short sell stock, to 1uy on margin,
identical endoNments, transaction costs QS1rokerage-feesSR, professional traders
as e5perimental su1Mects, nor price caps and oors. The only possi1ility they
identify to reduce 1u11les is to familiariPe some participants Nith the results
of the Smith, Suchanek, Williams Q"988R paper rst. SchNartP and 4ng Q"989R
check the Shouse moneyS hypothesis - they let people trade Nith their oNn money
-, to little avail.
Smith, Suchanek, Williams Q"988R also hypothesiPed that the descri1ed trad-
ing pattern might 1e due to risk-aversion in early periods Qtrades under funda-
mental valueR that leads to price increases in su1se[uent periods Nhich in turn
create momentumV 1ut Porter, Smith Q"995R rule out risk-aversion as a maMor
factor. Bu11les are also sta1le Nith respect to di!erences in market organiPation
Qvan Boening, Williams, UaMaster Q"99_RR.
Only futures markets QPorter, Smith Q"995RR and the e5perience of su1Mects
have 1een found to moderate 1u11les. The latter result has 1een cele1rated as
a partial if not complete reconciliation of stock market 1u11le e5periments Nith
the predictions of economic theory. We have our dou1ts. The use of e5perienced
su1Mects amounts to re-endoNing rookies Nho got stripped of all cash on a rst
try, and to 1ringing them 1ack to trade again Nith the same players that they
knoN Must ruined them. Successful traders Nho continue to participate in real
stock markets for a long time though are professional trading houses Qand some
lucky individualsR, and !"#$% rookies shoN up regularly."
"4necdotically, Ro1ert Wilson pointed out that practitioners estimate that the average
trading rookie has perished after a1out si5 months.
_
Be that as it may, e5perimental stock market 1u11les arise, and are sta1le
Nith respect to virtually all market parameters. Thus the [uestiona Nhat to
do a1out themb In the Sreal NorldS, the 1est knoNn response is to raise key
interest rates, usually 1y 25 1ase points at a time, sometimes 1y 50. This
creates higher opportunity costs of holding stock, and is meant to directly dis-
encourage investments as Nell.
This paper focuses on the rst ideaa interest policy and opportunity costs.
We introduce a portfolio alternative to trading in stocksa an interest-1earing
1ond. Based on an endogenous interest rate policy algorithm, Ne raise the
interest rate in treatment groups Nhen Ne o1serve 1u11les. Xontrol groups
- unknoNn to them - face a 5ed interest rate. We are interested in several
[uestions. One, is it possi1le to inuence 1u11les - to reduce them 1ased on
one or some of a variety of 1u11le measures Ne proposeb TNo, does the portfolio
choice of participants e5hi1it elements of rational choice, or present neN puPPlesb
:iven that no-one has e5amined this market structure 1efore, Ne also Nant to
thoroughly e5amine hoN our results compare to earlier e5periments. We nd
some support for [uestions num1er one and tNo. Most nota1ly though Ne
o1serve a clear increase in market volatility 1ecause of our interest policy. We
also nd evidence against the &'()*# +&"()')+&(),- %.+,(%#$)$ ( a criticism that
has 1een occasionally raised against la1oratory economics in generalR, i.e. the
claim that 1u11les arise 1ecause our participants are 1ored and all they can do
is trade for the duration of our e5periments.
Section 2 descri1es the e5periment in more detail. Section _ analyPes the
data. We rst dene some 1u11le measures, then formulate ve conMectures
that Ne are going to check Nith our analysis. 4fter a 1rief overvieN over our
results, Ne [uantify our 1u11le measures and other treatment varia1les. In
order to get an idea of the percentage of fundamental QrationalR trading in
our e5periment, Ne introduce a noise trading model and estimate the implied
proportion of rational traders 1y markets. 4n analysis of our conMectures folloNs,
and some conclusions are in section 4. The appendi5 contains further data, the
e5perimental instructions, and the interest rate policy algorithm.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Basic design
Our e5periment deals Nith portfolio choice of individual investors. Participants
receive an initial endoNment of stocks and of a ctitious e5perimental currency
Qcalled ]:ulden]R. The stock is characteriPed as folloNsa
! 4 nite life of "5 periods.
! 4 stationary random dividend payment at the end of each period of either
0, 8, 28, or d0 :ulden Qfor an average of 24R. 4ll payo! are e[ually likely.
! No redemption value at the end of the e5periment, i.e. after period "5.
4
RealiPed trading gains and dividend income is immediately added to the
participantsS Norking capital and can 1e used, in su1se[uent periods, for further
trade in stocks.2
4lternatively, participants can invest cash in interest-1earing 1onds. The
interest rate is ! = 0"0# in the rst period, 1ut varia1le in principle. The
interest ! is paid at the end of the period. Our su1Mects take a portfolio decision
each period. They cannot access money invested in 1onds Qto trade in stocksR
for the rest of the respective period. The e5periment thus consists of three
phasesa
". Participants decide hoN to split their total cash for the current period.
Money put into 1onds 1ears interest, 1ut cannot 1e used to trade. Money
in trade accounts does not 1ear interest, 1ut can 1e used to trade stocks
in phase 2 of this period.
2. Trade in stocks takes place. Trade is organiPed as a continuous dou1le
auction and lasts for "50 seconds each period.
_. The dividend for this period is determined. Income from dividends on
shares of stock and interest on 1onds is added to the participantsS total
cash account, together Nith the current amounts in their trade and 1ond
accounts. 4t the 1eginning of the folloNing period, participants have
money only in their (,(&0 '&$% &'',1-($, and a num1er of shares in their
$(,'2 &'',1-($3
In gure ", Ne shoN the net present value QNPVR of the stock at an initial
interest rate of ! = 0"0#. >or period # ! "1$ 2$ """$ 1##, the NPV is dened as
NPVQ#R =
15X
!#"
% &dividend"'
1 + !
$
using the o1vious notation. Valuation of an asset using the NPV concept is
standard practice and amounts to assuming risk-neutrality._ The 1++#" 4,1-5
*&01# QUBVR is the folloNinga assume the highest possi1le dividend payment
is draNn in each period and calculate the NPV of a stock Nith this certain
dividend.
Previous e5periments Qsuch as Uei, Noussair, Plott Q"999R, Porter, Smith
Q"995R, Smith, Suchanek, Williams Q"988R, or Smith, van Boening, Wellford
Q2000RR informed the participants in each period a1out the current NPV of
one share of stock, to make sure that 1u11les did not merely happen 1ecause
of individual calculation errors. Because in their setting no interest-1earing
alternative e5ists, the NPV is simply the sum of e5pected dividends. :iven that
2We conducted a num1er of control e5periments in Nhich interest income Nas paid out at
the end of the e5periment, 1ut Nas not availa1le to participants 1efore. While this design
conforms less to reality, it alloNs to precisely distinguish 1etNeen the income and su1stitution
e!ect of the interest policyV 1ut as it turned out, 1u11le siPes Nere very compara1le.
_4ssuming risk-aversion Nould only increase 1u11le siPes.
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>igure "a Net present value QNPVR of a stock Qat 5 percent interestR.
our e5periment is more complicated Qeven Nith no change in interest ratesR, Ne
cannot e5pect everyone to immediately understand the concept of a discounted
NPV. 4nd to e5plain to our participants hoN a change in interest rates inuences
the NPV Nould almost certainly have confused some of them.
>or this reason, and 1ecause our focus Nas not on 1u11les per se 1ut on the
impact of interest policy on 1u11les, Ne decided to omit the periodic reports
of NPVs to the participants. Instead, through careful instructions and a set of
test [uestions, Ne made sure that the participants understood Nell the dividend
draN in each period - its impact on ]e5pected] values, and 1est and Norst
possi1le cases. 4lthough several of the participating students had previously
attended classes in introductory statistics, Ne did not rely on any mathematical
or statistical language. We provided calculators for those that Nanted them.
While the instructions pointed out that the interest rate might change, Ne did
not indicate if, Nhen or 1y Nhich amount a change Nould happen. Note also
that students could neither trade on margin, nor short sell assets.
4 translation of the e5perimental instructions is in the appendi5. The ap-
pendi5 also has screen shots of the e5periment.
2.2 The experimental policy
Our interest rate policy algorithm aims to appro5imate the 1ehavior of central
1anks such as the >ederal Reserve Board Q>edR. The 1asic idea is to raise rates
Nhen Ne see a positive 1u11le, and to loNer them in the opposite situation
QNhere S1u11leS is dened as persistant trade at values signicantly Qmore than
50 percentR di!erent from the NPV of our stockR.
We do not change the interest rate more fre[uently than every 4 periods,
d
and not 1efore period 4, for three reasonsa one, to not introduce e5tra noise
through continual adMustmentsV tNo, to keep participants from guessing Nhen
the ne5t change Nould happenV and three, to appro5imate another SrealS >ed
policy - fre[uent changes are unusual 1ecause the market might perceive them
as informative Qusually negativeR signals in themselves.4
4fter interventions in one direction, central 1anks Nill attempt to create
some leeNay for further interventions during times that are less pro1lematic -
e.g., 1y loNering interest rates to an intermediate level Nhen markets cool o!
after raising them rst. Because, for statistical reasons, Ne restricted ourselves
to only ve di!erent interest rates Q0.0", 0.05, 0."", 0."5, 0.2"R, Ne actually faced
the same pro1lem. Therefore, after interventions in one direction, Ne intervened
instantly into the opposite direction Nhen mean contract prices hit the stockSs
NPV QNhich happened only onceR.
We only used an endogenous algorithm for e5periments Nith ine5perienced
su1Mects. In order to make statistical comparisons meaningful, Ne su1Mected
groups of e5perienced traders to the same interest rates they had Nitnessed
1efore.
The appendi5 contains the code of the interest rate algorithm.
2.3 Procedures
2.3.1 Procedures common to all experiments
Everyone initially received the same endoNment in cash and stocks, 1ut Ne did
not tell the participants. There is su#cient evidence Qsee e.g. King, Smith,
Williams, van Boening Q"99_R, Porter, Smith Q"995R or Xaginalp, Porter, Smith
Q"998RR that initial heterogeneity of cash or stock accounts does not signicantly
inuence the results of 1u11le e5periments. Because the same is not true for
(,(&0 QconsolidatedR endoNments, Ne controlled for the latter 1y providing the
same initial endoNments in all e5periments Q"0 shares of stock and _,d00 :ulden
per participant5R.
4ll su1Mects Nere undergraduates from the University of Zurich and the
Eidgenoessische Technische HochschulefZurich QETHR. The IEW maintains a
large data1ase of a1out _,000 - 4,000 students Nho they recruit at the 1egin-
ning of the academic year to participate in ]economic e5periments in decision
making.] E5perimental su1Mects are called upon for participation Nhen needed,
their participation and success recorded for future reference, and generally paid
a S>R "0 Qg dR shoNup fee in addition to a success dependent 1onus at the end
of e5periments.
4ll prior 1u11le e5periments esta1lish the inuence of e5perience on the
trading 1ehaviour of participants. We thus included a num1er of sessions Nith
once-e5perienced traders. We divided each session into tNo groups of \ or 8
4 In this respect, 200" is a very unusual year.
5The num1ers are from a recent e5periment 1y Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"R. More precisely,
they provide either \,200 :ulden and 0 shares, or 0 :ulden and 20 shares of stock per par-
ticipant. While this Nas in line Nith their research focus Q1u11les Nithout the possi1ility of
speculative gainsR, Ne had to adMust it to our setting.
\
participants Nho received the same dividends. One group served as the treat-
ment QpolicyR group, the other as the control Qno policyR group. E5periments
Nith ine5perienced participants lasted on average 2 hours and _0 minutes, those
Nith e5perienced participants a1out " hour and "5 minutes. Ta1le " gives an
overvieN over all session.
4fter the e5periment, the participants e5changed their :ulden into SNiss
>ranks at a rate knoNn to them from the start. 4lthough Ne cali1rated the e5-
periments so that the average participant received a compensation compara1le
Q1y hourR to a SNiss student salary, Ne also created incentives for the partici-
pants to trade to the 1est of their a1ilities. >inal payo!s ranged from roughly
S>R "_.00 Qincluding a shoNup fee of S>R "0.00R to S>R 80.00 Qa1out g \ - g
50R - a siPea1le success dependent spread.
The trade softNare Nas Z-Tree. Z-Tree is a modular Xhh-1ased language
originally conceived 1y Urs >isch1acher Q"999R for economic e5periments at the
Institut fuer Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung of the University of Zurichd. In
short, e5perimental participants interact Nith each other Nith the help of client
terminals and are supervised 1y a server Qthe form of a local area netNork
QU4NRR, a structure that alloNs for the fast interventions necessary for our
e5periments.
2.3.2 Generic experiments
4s it turned out, most e5periments had the same interest rates. We call them
6#-#")' #7+#")8#-($ Qta1le 2R.
4s a shortcut, Ne used the la1elsa
". :eneric e5periments Nith ine5perienced tradersa
! QI,PRa Policy
! QI,NRa No policy
2. :eneric e5periments Nith e5perienced tradersa
! QE,PRa Policy
! QE,Na No policy
>igure 2 shoNs the NPV of a generic QI,PR e5periment. We assume static
e5pectations, i.e. that participants e5pect the current interest rate to persist
until the end of the e5periment. Naturally, this Nill not 1e true for every partic-
ipant in every e5periment. Still, given the structure of our e5perimental policy
QNhich 1ounds the num1er of interventions from a1ove 1y _R, and given that the
e5periment is short, Ne see no reason to 1elieve that participants systematically
deviate from this assumption. We adopt it as a Norking hypothesis, and make
no further mention of it.
dZ-tree can 1e doNnloaded in e5change for a free licence at
httpaffNNN.ieN.uniPh.chfPtreefhoNtoget.php.
8
Session Policy E5perienced Su1Mects Wate conducted
"a Zes No 8 ""f29f2000
"1 No No 8 ""f29f2000
2a Zes No 8 "2f0df2000
21 No No 8 "2f0df2000
_a Zes No 8 "2f"4f2000
_1 No No 8 "2f"4f2000
4 Zes Zes 8 "2f"4f2000
5a Zes No 8 "2f"5f2000
51 No No 8 "2f"5f2000
da Zes No 8 0"f25f200"
d1 No No 8 0"f25f200"
\ No Zes 8 0"f25f200"
8a Zes, non-generic No 8 0"f2df200"
81 Zes, non-generic No 8 0"f2df200"
9a Zes No 8 0"f29f200"
91 No No 8 0"f29f200"
"0 Zes Zes 8 0"f29f200"
""a Zes No \ 02f0"f200"
""1 No No \ 02f0"f200"
"2 Zes Zes \ 02f0"f200"
Sessions a and 1 Nere held simultaneously Nith the same dividend draN for each group
Policies Nere generic Nhere not indicated di!erently
E5periment " su!ered from a softNare glitch and is not used for statistical tests
Ta1le "a Basic summary statistics of the e5perimental sessions
:eneric e5periments
Period
Treatment "-_ 4-\ 8-"" "2-"5
Policy 0.05 0."" 0."5 0.2"
No policy 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Non-generic e5periments
Non-generic I
Period "-4 5-\ 8-"" "2-"5
Interest rate 0.05 0."" 0.05 0.05
Non-generic II
Period "-5 d-9 8-"" "2-"5
Interest rate 0.05 0.0" 0."" 0."5
Ta1le 2a :eneric and non-generic e5periments
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>igure 2a NPV of generic QI,PR e5periment
2.3.3 Non-generic experiments
4dditionally, Ne conducted tNo e5periments Nith non-standard policies. We
did not include them into any statistical test, 1ut they may serve for future
research Qsee ta1le 2R.
3 Analysis
We rst dene di!erent measurement varia1les such as siPe and duration of
1u11les, intensity of trade, portfolio choice, market volatility and so on. We
then formulate some research hypotheses that Ne are a1le to investigate Nith
the help of our e5periment. In order to 1e a1le to check our conMectures, Ne
[uantify our measurement varia1les 1y treatment. We propose a fairly standard
model of noise trading. 4 detailed analysis of our research hypotheses concludes
this section.
3.1 Bubble measures and treatment variables
Much of Nhat folloNs focuses on the folloNing varia1lesa
". 9#*)&(),-: 9#*)&(),-($) is the standardiPed distance of o1served mean
contract prices from prices that Nould ensue if risk-neutral traders 1eliev-
ing in dividend-discount models Nere trading under common knoNledge
in a stock Nith the descri1ed dividend structure and lifetimeV 5#*)&(),-(-)
"0
the distance to the e5pected 1-discounted dividend value. >ormally,
1
1#
15X
"#1
$&" " f"$
)0
5#*)&(),-($)
1
1#
15X
"#1
$&" "(!)"$
)0
5#*)&(),-(-).
&" and f" are mean contract price respectively net present value QNPVR of
the stock in period #, and
(!)" =
15X
!#"
%&*!)!', # ! "1$ 2$ """$ 1## .
%&*!)"' is the e5pected dividend in #, i.e. in this e5periment %&*!)"' # 2*.
We normaliPe deviation 1y the num1er of stocks outstanding Q80R, Nhich is
constant 1ecause Ne do not retire stock 1efore the end of the e5periment.
Intuitively, Ne thus o1tain a measure akin to overvaluation per share. We
also normaliPe to make the 1u11le measures compara1le in siPe Nith each
other.
2. <#0&()*# 41440# measures the siPe of the 1u11le relative to fundamental
value. Its formal denition is as
1
1#
15X
"#1
$&" " f"$
f"
.
_. 91"&(),-: Ma5imum num1er of consecutive periods during Nhich the
mean contract price increases relative to the net present value QNPVR
of the stock, i.e. formally
+,-
1!"!15
"+ . &" " f" $ &"$1 " f"$1 $ """ $ &"$# " f"$## $
Nhere &" and f" are as 1efore.
4. =8+0)(15#: 4 measure of the overall siPe of the 1u11le - the normaliPed
di!erence of the largest and smallest deviation of mean contract prices
from the net present value QNPVR of the stock. We normaliPe 1y the net
present value of period ". >ormally, &8+0)(15# is dened as
+,-
1!"!15
"
&" " f"
f1
#
" +/0
1!"!15
"
&" " f"
f1
#
5. >,0&()0)(.: 4 measure of the overall volatility of trade prices in all periods.
To make this num1er meaningful in comparison, Ne normaliPe again. We
rst calculate the normaliPed volatility of trade prices for each period, i.e.
," =
$
, ar!a/0e(trade prices in period #R
&"
, # ! "1$ 2$ """$ 1## $
""
Nhich is then averaged out over all periodsa
1
1#
15X
"#1
,".
>,0&()0)(. is an indicator of the marketSs overall volatility, not a volatiliy
itself 1y any standard denition.
d. ?1"-,*#" a The total volume of trade over all "5 periods divided 1y the
num1er of shares outstanding, (1"-,*#" is an indicator of trade intensity
in the e5periment.
3.2 Research Hypotheses
We formulate ve conMectures and try to shed some light on them Nith our
e5periments. Some of the conMectures e5amine hypotheses from prior research
in our setting Qin particular Xaginalp, Porter, Smith Q"998R, Smith, van Boening,
Wellford Q2000R, and Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"RR. Others investigate [uestions
that are specic to our research design. Several have potential implications for
economic policy. We generally use the intuitive a11reviation BQI,PR to indicate
the e5tent of a 1u11le in an e5periment Nith ine5perienced traders and interest
policy, and similar a11reviations for the other casesV this should 1e understood
as a semantic varia1le. 4t the end of each conMecture, Ne indicate Nhether
Ne Nere a1le to uphold or refute it 1ased on our analysis of section _.5. If
the evidence is am1iguous, Ne instead conclude that the conMecture is ]mostly
upheld QrefutedR], or ]inconclusive.]
UetSs rst check for 1u11lesa
Conjecture 1 !"#$% &'&&() *+,-.*)#$# (&"%/0"12 $32'%.$-3 *+,-.*)4
#$#)3 = ',88,- 5#-)(),- %&$ & 41440# &$ $1$(&)-#5 +")'# 5#*)&(),- !",8 !1-@
5&8#-(&0 *&01#3 A! ("&5#"$ )-(#"&'( B%)'% #&'% ,(%#" 1-5#" ',88,- 2-,B0@
#56# ,! (%# 8&"2#( $("1'(1"# &-5 4&'2B&"5 )-51'( ',""#'(0.C $1'% 41440#$ B,105
-,( ,''1" ($##C #363C ?)",0# (1EFG))3 ?%#"#!,"#C ',-$)5#" "$( (%# ',-H#'(1"#
(%&( 41440#$ 1-&-)8,1$0. 5, -, %&++#- &'",$$ &00 ("#&(8#-($C )3#3 &$$18# (%&(
!(678):!(67;):!(<78):=3 (1)>'.)2)
4 higher interest rate impacts value in tNo Nays. Since 1onds and stocks
are gross-su1stitutes, an increase in interest rates should decrease stock prices
and 1u11le siPes - at least in the case of naive 1u11les. On the other hand,
a higher interest rate creates additional income. There is some evidence that
additional income increases the magnitude of a 1u11le Q1oth Xaginalp, Porter,
Smith Q"998R and Smith, van Boening, Wellford Q2000R conMecture this, 1ut only
the former provide statistically signicant supportR. Because of the presence of
portfolio alternatives in our e5periments, it is unclear Nhether greater Nealth
Nill translate into higher trade li[uiditya Nhile relative investment in 1onds
should 1e higher in QI,PR e5periments, it is less clear Nhat it means for a1solute
"2
trade li[uidity. Overall, hoNever, e5periments Nith interest policy should tend
to reduce 1u11les.
Conjecture 2 8-($%+ )!)%. -3 &'&&()# "32 ?"1/). ($@'$2$.+A ?%# )-(#"@
#$( +,0)'. "&)$#$ ,++,"(1-)(. ',$($I &0(%,16% )( )-'"#&$#$ (,(&0 B#&0(%C )( 5#'"#&$#$
("&5# 0)J1)5)(.3 K,(% !&'(,"$ (#-5 (, "#51'# (%# )-(#-$)(. &-5 0)2#0)%,,5 ,! (%#
,''1"&-'# ,! 41440#$C )3#3 !(678)2!(67;)3 (?-#.(+ ',*)(2)
4 recent paper 1y Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"R has e5perimental su1Mects trade
an asset, and simultaneously in a market for Nhat can 1e considered a service.
It turns out that such a design reduces errors in decision making compared to
a 1enchmark of stock trading only QTypical errors in decision making - or more
precisely, non-theory conform trading - Nould 1e trades at more than the upper
1ound value QUBVRR. In Uei et altSs setting, the value of a stock is completely
uncorrelated to the service marketa the only feed1ack is that time spent in one
market is time less spent in another. In our case, correlation is higha directly, 1y
hoN interest rates change the NPV, 1ut also indirectly, through the endogeneity
of the interest rate policy algorithm. It is our conMecture that the earlier results
Nere partly due to the fact that their e5periment had completely segregated
markets.
Conjecture 3 B3%)1."$3.+ *+,-.*)#$#3 ?%# )-(#"#$( "&(# +,0)'. )-'"#&$#$
(%# 1-'#"(&)-(. )- (%# $(,'2 8&"2#(: +")'# *,0&()0)(. 6",B$I ("&5)-6 +&((#"-$ #7@
+0)'&40# 4. 0&'2 ,! ',88,- 2-,B0#56# ,! "&(),-&0)(. &"# 0#$$ 0)2#0.C B%)0# (%,$#
+,)-()-6 (, &'(1&0 )""&(),-&0)(. &"# 8,"# 0)2#0.3 (',*)(2)
What a1out portfolio choice more generalb
Conjecture 4 C"(') 21$D)3 $3D)#.?)3. *+,-.*)#$# (,-1.>-($- %*-$%))A
L7+#")8#-(&0 +&"()')+&-($ "#',6-)M# )-*#$(8#-( ,++,"(1-)()#$ ((%#)" +,"(!,0), '%,)'#
"##'($ (%#8)3 N&0"&$)&- +")'# &5H1$(8#-( &'',1-($ !," 5)!#"#-'#$ )- +",(&4)0@
)(. @ )! (%#$# 5)!#"#-'#$ &"# 1-&-()')+&(#5\3 =$ & "#$10(C (%# +"#$#-'# ,! )-*#$(@
8#-( ,++,"(1-)()#$ )-'"#&$#$ (%# $1''#$$ 5#+#-5#-( $+"#&5 )- )-',8#3 (',*)(2)
XonMecture _ relates to Nhat has 1een called the active participation hypoth-
esis Q4PHR 1y Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"R. In their oNn Nords, the 4PH says
that a !"&'(),- ,! (%# *,018# )- (%# 8&"2#($ )$ "#0&(#5 (, (%# !&'( (%&( +&"()')@
+&(),- )- (%# &$$#( 8&"2#( )$ (%# ,-0. &'()*)(. &*&)0&40# !," $14H#'($. If market
participation Nere indeed solely due to the lack of availa1le alternative activi-
ties, markets should not systematically di!er Nith respect to errors in decision
\ Investment professionals knoN Nell a1out the importance of surprises. Before meetings of
the Board of :overnors, market pundits provide consensus estimates of the e5pected decision
of the >ed. If e5pectations are merely met, a change in interest rates has a modest to no
impact on the stock market. To merely conrm Nhat has 1een anticipated 1efore may even
1e counterproductive. 4s an e5ample, this is Nhat happened on 0_f20f200" Nhen the >ed
loNered interest rates 1y 50 1ase points as had 1een generally e5pected. The result Nas that
markets tum1led - the WoN Fones Industrial Inde5 almost ended the day in 1ear territory for
the rst time in "0 years. The situation Nas particularly grave 1ecause a1out a third of the
forecasts had predicted a change as dramatic as of \5 1ase points.
"_
making. XonMecture 4 points in the same directiona actions and choices are
deli1erate and directional. We thus have
Conjecture 5 611)()D"3%) -> .*) "%.$D) ,"1.$%$,".$-3 *+,-.*)#$#3 O1"
#7+#")8#-( 5,#$ -,( $1++,"( (%# &'()*# +&"()')+&(),- %.+,(%#$)$ (=PQ)3 O(%#"
!&'(,"$ $##8 (, )-1#-'# (%# ("&5)-6 4#%&*)," 8,"#C $1'% &$ (%# "#',6-)(),- ,!
*&01#3 (',*)(2)
3.3 Overview
>igure _ shoNs 1u11les across di!erent treatments, from - as Ne call them
- a naive, a sophisticated, and a relative perspective Qsee section _." for deni-
tionsR. The num1ers are averages over all e5periments 1y treatment, 1ut they
are representative for the individual e5periments as Nell Qthe appendi5 contains
graphs for all e5perimentsR. We normaliPed the 1u11le measures so they corre-
spond to overvaluation per share. >igure _ also charts the mean contract volume
Qor turnoverR per period per treatment, and the volatility of the turnover.
Note rst that any di!erences for periods " to _ are likely due to the small
sample nature of our e5periments Qd sessions per treatment in the ine5perienced
caseR, 1ecause the rst policy intervention Nas after period _. This said, gure
_ shoNs that the only clear treatment e!ect is that of e5perience. The interest
policy also slightly decreases the siPe and duration of 1u11les in ine5perienced
sessions Qmost nota1ly naive 1u11les after period 4R. Note also that the siPe
of relative 1u11les tends to increase over time in no policy session, Nhereas
the interest policy reverses this tendency after an initial increase. Briey, the
1u11le siPes compare as in B(I,N)%B(I,P)3B(E,P)8. The same is true for
turnover.
4nother point has to our knoNledge not 1een noticed 1efore. Both the
graphs of naive and of sophisticated 1u11les converge to 0 over time. Ear-
lier authors have generally argued that this reconciles 1u11le Nith the rational
e5pectations hypothesis Q1ecause, as they point out, it indicates Bayesian learn-
ingR. But recall that Ne are in a situation in Nhich one varia1le, f", converges to
0, as Nell as another, 454" Qrepresenting either of the rst tNo 1u11le measuresR.
HoN much do Ne learn then from the fact that 454" & 0b This could still mean
that $%$t&t ' +( although f" and 454" 1oth go to Pero - 1ut at di!erent orders of
magnitude. The relative 1u11le chart shoNs that, appro5imately, $%$t&t & 1"# in
1oth ine5perienced treatments. The e5perienced sessions approach a value of
a1out 1. While Ne do not 1elieve that the value of 1"# Qor 1R has any particular
signicance, Ne should still keep this in mind Nhen talking a1out 1u11les that
]...converge to Pero] QSmith, van Boening, Wellford Q2000RR.
>igure 4 shoNs the average trade volume in more detail - turnover is very
compara1le in siPe across treatments in ine5perienced sessions -, gure 5 the
volatility of mean contract prices 1y treatment.
8We e5clude the QE,NR treatment to keep the graphs more reada1le. We are not interested
in QE,NR e5periments per se and used them only as a 1enchmark for the 1aseline e5periments.
They are also included in later statistical tests.
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>igure _a Bu11les and trade volume in e5perimental stock markets 1y treatment
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>igure 4a Trade volume in stock markets
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>igure 5a Volatility of mean contract prices
"d
Treatment
Measure I,P I,N E,P E,N
Wuration _.__ 5.8_ _ 2
Turnover _.\\ _.9d 2.55 2.8_
4mplitude ".02 ".08 0.d5 0._d
Price variance 0.28 0."8 0."_ 0."0
Norm. deviation QnaiveR "."4 ".d4 0.48 0."5
Norm. deviation Qsoph.R ".9" 2.02 0.80 0.58
Relative 1u11le "._d ".20 0.50 0._"
Ta1le _a Bu11le measures 1y treatment
The variance of mean contract prices e5hi1its a clear treatment e!ect. In
e5periments Nith interest policy, it is in all 1ut one period an upper envelope
of the volatility in control e5periments Nith no interest policy. Notice the con-
sidera1le spike in one of the _ intervention periods Qperiod 8R, Nhich in our eyes
reects the uncertainty introduced to the system through the interest policy.
If Ne admit price variance as a 1u11le measure, the volatility chart implies a
ranking of B(I,P)3B(I,N)3B(E,P).
3.4 Quanti!cation of bubbles and simple explanatory mod-
els
3.4.1 Measurement of bubbles
Ta1le _ shoNs the values of the 1u11le measures for all treatments.
We usually conducted parametric and non-parametric tests of our hypotheses
1ecause Ne often had to deal Nith small samples. If 1oth tests point to the same
result, Ne accept itV if one test is signicant 1ut not the other, Ne try to nd
further evidence. Ta1le 4 shoNs the test results. Both tNo-sample t-tests and
Wilco5on tests check for di!erences in the distri1ution QlocationR of tNo random
vectors. They are essentially e[uivalent. The Wilco5on test Qalso knoNn as
Ranksum, or Mann-Whitney testR is non-parametric and distri1ution free, and
hence usually fares 1etter if the underlying distri1ution is non-normal, or the
sample siPe is small.
"\
Measure Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value Wilco5on p-value
Wuration H0a I,P 2 I,N -".2_9 Q0."22R -0.9\_ Q0."d5R
H0a I,P 3 E,P 0.2"0 Q0.420R 0.52_ Q0._0"R
4mplitude H0a I,P 2 I,N -0.458 Q0._28R 2"0"4 Q".000R
H0a I,P 3 E,P 2.24_ Q0.0_0R ".549 Q0.0d"R
Price H0a I,P 3 I,N ".\48 Q0.05dR ".\d" Q0.0_9R
variance H0a I,P 3 E,P 2.052 Q0.040R 2,_24 Q0.0"0R
WeviationQsR H0a I,P 2 I,N -0.252 Q0.40_R -0.480 Q0._"dR
H0a I,P 3 E,P 2.8"0 Q0.0"_R 2._24 Q0.0"0R
Turnover H0a I,P i I,N -0."8_ Q0.85\R -0.480 Q0.d_"R
H0a I,P i E,P "."__ Q0.294R ".0__ Q0._02R
Rel. 1u11le H0a I,P 2 I,N -0.22\ Q0.58\R 0.480 Q0._"dR
H0a I,P 3 E,P ".924 Q0.048R 2._24 Q0.020R
WeviationQnR H0a I,P 2 I,N -"._d8 Q0."0"R -".d0" Q0.055R
H0a I,P 3 E,P ".\\8 Q0.059R ".80\ Q0.0_5R
Ta1le 4a Test of di!erences in 1u11le measures
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We also conducted a regression analysis of the 1u11le measures using seem-
ingly unrelated regression QSURR. In the parametric case, Ne had si5 sets of
regression e[uations. 4 generic e[uation is of the form of Q"R. "* is Nhite
noise, *!+ is the value of the varia1le duration in treatment ! QPiQI,PR, NiQI,NR,
EPiQE,PR, ENiQE,NRR and e5periment 7 Qsee ta1le "R. The coe#cient !*p
is the 1aseline Qine5periencedR coe#cient for 6#-#")' e5periments Nith interest
policy. !*N is the 1aseline Qine5periencedR coe#cient for 6#-#")' e5periments
Nith interest rate 5ed at 5 j. !*E%p measures the impact if the e5perimental
"8
su1Mects Nere once e5perienced, i.e. had already participated in a prior run of
the same e5periment.
The other 1u11le measures are # QturnoverR, a QamplitudeR, ) QvolatilityR,
/* Qdeviation - sophisticated or naiveR and r4 Qrelative 1u11leR. Xlearly, there
are possi1le cross-e[uation correlations, so Ne stack the di!erent e[uations as
in Q2R and perform a SUR estimation.
!""""""#
*
#
a
)
/*
r4
$%%%%%%& =
!""""""#
6 0 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0
0 0 6 0 0 0
0 0 0 6 0 0
0 0 0 0 6 0
0 0 0 0 0 6
$%%%%%%&
!""""""#
!*
!"
!,
!-
!.*
!/$
$%%%%%%&+
!""""""#
"*
""
",
"-
".*
"/$
$%%%%%%& ,Q2R
)* . 8 = 9! + "
It has 1een recommended elseNhere QXonover Q"999RR that in e5perimental
designs for Nhich no non-parametric tests e5ist one should use the usual analysis
of variance on the data and then perform the same procedure on the rank
transformed data. We thus ranked our e5perimental data in ascending order
and ran another SUR on the ranked data. The results of 1oth the parametric
estimation and the estimation using rank-transformed data are in ta1le 5.
Ta1le d contains the results of some hypothesis tests Ne performed on the
data from ta1le 5. The statistics shoNn are t- respectively >-testsV in the case
of the non-parametric regressions, these tests are e[uivalent to Mann-Whitney
respectively Kruskal Wallis tests QXonover Q"999RR. Both series of tests generally
point in the same direction Qon the "0 j signicance level they agree in every
caseR.
The coe#cients of ta1le _ indicate that in e5periments Nith ine5perienced
traders the 1u11le measures - Nith the e5ception of price variance - are smaller
in e5periments Nith interest policy than in 1aseline no policy e5periments. In
other Nords, e5cept for volatility, interest policy has a positive - if small - impact
on 1u11les. We ne5t checked Nhether the evidence is statistically signicant
Qta1le 4R. The data only modestly support that 1u11le measures are smaller in
policy treatments Qon a "0 j signicance level, this holds only for naive 1u11les,
Nith a more generous decision criterion also for durationR. Price variance clearly
increases in policy e5periments.
The regressions give a more insightful feed1ack on these comparisons 1e-
cause they shoN cause and e!ect. The coe#cients are generally highly signif-
icant Qta1le 5R, e5cept for e5perienced coe#cients for turnover and duration
Qthe coe#cient for turnover is slightly signicantR. Ta1le d contains the results
of statistical tests. The test of e[uality of the 1u11le measures Q!' = !(R
cannot 1e reMected, e5cept for volatility again. The impact of e5perience is
generally positive Q!e5p % 0R, e5cept for duration. 4ll tests strongly reMect the
more e5treme hypothesis that !' = !( = 0. Summing up, and e5cluding
volatility for the moment, the data are compati1le Nith a relative ranking of
"9
Parametric estimation
Wependent varia1le
Xoe#- Wura- 4mpli- Price Wevi- Turn- Rel. Wevia-
cient tion tude variance ationQsR over 1u11le tionQnR
!0 _.d8 ".0d 0.2_ ".2_ _.\\ "._8 ".95
Qp-val.R Q0.00"R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!( 5.48 ".05 0."4 ".5d _.9\ ".2d ".99
Qp-val.R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!) -"._8 -0.48 -0."0 -0.92 -".20 -0.85 -".22
Qp-val.R Q0.4_5R Q2"0"4R Q0.02\R Q0.004R Q0."49R Q0.00dR Q0.00"R
<2 0.d\ 0.9d 0.84 0.84 0.8\ 0.84 0.89
>-stat. _2.8_ _\_.29 85.\5 8_.42 "05.49 8"._2 "25."_
- "d "d "d "d "d "d "d
Ranked regressions
Wependent varia1le
Xoe#- Wura- 4mpli- Price Wevi- Turn- Rel. Wevia-
cient tion tude variance ationQsR over 1u11le tionQnR
!' 8.4\ "0.\ "2.0_ 9.2\ 8.48 9.9_ "0._2
Qp-val.R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!( "0.2 "0._ \.d_ "".4 "0.d8 9.4 "0.52
Qp-val.R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!) -2.9 -8." -d.4_ -d.8 -_.\8 -4.8 -\.d2
Qp-val.R Q0.244R Q2"0"4R Q0.00"R Q2"0"4R Q0.""dR Q0.050R Q2"0"4R
<2 0.8" 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.89
>-stat. d\.90 "4d._9 ""5.4\ "_2."2 \4."5 \".49 "_0._8
- "d "d "d "d "d "d "d
Notea seemingly unrelated regression of measures "-d together. Measure \ is from a
separate SUR.
Ta1le 5a 4nalysis of 1u11le measures
20
Parametric regressions
Wependent varia1le
Wura- 4mpli- Price Wevi- Turn- Rel. Wevi-
Null H. tion tude variance ationQsR over 1u11le ationQnR
!' = !( "._5 0.0" 4."4 "._5 0.08 0."9 0.0"
Q0.245R Q0.925R Q0.042R Q0.245R Q0.\\8R Q0.dd"R Q0.904R
!' = !( 29.4d __9.d" \\.d0 8".2\ 9".5" \\.d" ""4.48
= 0 Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!)10 % 0 -0.\8" -4.""5 -2.2"5 -2.8\0 -0."44 -2.\d0 -_.298
Q0.2"8R Q2"0"4R Q0.0"_R Q0.002R Q0.0\4R Q0.00_R Q2"0"4R
Ranked regressions
Wependent varia1le
Wura- 4mpli- Price Wevi- Turn- Rel. Wevi-
Null H. tion tude variance ation over 1u11le ationQnR
!' = !( 0.d4 0.0\ d._8 ".d9 ".09 0.\5 0.0"
Q0.425R Q0.\99R Q0.0"2R Q0."94R Q0._00R Q0._8dR Q0.904R
!' = !( 59.\d "4_.d\ "08._5 "28.55 d\.5" "_4.0_ "2\.42
= 0 Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
!)10 % 0 -"."dd -4.5"" -_.224 -_.d"\ -".5\0 -4.__5 -4.02\
Q0."22R Q2"0"4R Q0.00"R Q2"0"4R Q0.058R Q2"0"4R Q2"0"4R
>irst roN are t- resp. >-statistics, the second p-values
Ta1le da Hypothesis tests
2"
B(E,P)2B(I,P)$B(I,N), Nith a possi1le e[uality in the second comparison.
Based on volatility, the ranking is une[uivocally B(I,P)3B(I,N)3B(E,P).
3.4.2 Measurement of liquidity, trading behavior and success
Liquidity >igure d charts consolidated total market li[uidity, i.e. the sum
of the total cash accounts of the participants 1y periodV it also shoNs trade
li[uidity. 4s such, it provides evidence of the income e!ect Qas opposed to the
su1stitution e!ectR of interest policy. Remark the clear and cumulative im-
pact of the higher interest rates in policy e5periments - total li[uidity increases
markedly. On the other hand, e5perience does not inuence total li[uidity much.
>igure \ charts the portfolio choice and a1solute trade li[uidity 1y treatment
and compares the investment decision 1etNeen treatments.
41solute trade li[uidity is higher in no policy treatments than in treatments
Nith interest policy Qconversely, a1solute investment in 1onds is higher in policy
than in no policy e5perimentsR. Similarly, relative investment in 1onds in QI,PR
e5periments is an upper envelope to relative investment in 1onds in QI,NR e5per-
iments. Even more clearly, investment in 1onds rises a1solutely and relatively
in e5periments Nith e5perienced traders.
>igure 8 shoNs hoN this investment 1ehavior varies across participants. In
other Nords, it charts the heterogeneity of the share of the participantsS portfolio
invested in 1onds. In every period, investment in 1onds varies less in QI,PR
e5periments compared to QI,NR e5periments.
Trading behavior We split the positive real line into three areas. 4ssume
the highest possi1le dividend payment is draNn in each period and calculate the
NPV of a stock Nith this certain dividend. 4s mentioned 1efore, call this the
1++#" 4,1-5 *&01# QUBVR, and trades at more than UBV high Qor ShSR. Trades
at h are special 1ecause no attitude toNards risk can Mustify value investment Qas
compared to investment for other reasons such as speculation, or computational
errorsR in the stock at a price of higher than UBV. Xonversely, Ne call deals
under the e5pected NPV of the stock loN Qor SlSR. Risk-neutral traders consider
deals at l as a 1argain. >inally, denote the interval 1etNeen l and h 1y SmS Qor
mediumR. >igure 9 charts these trading measures.
In QI,PR e5periments, there are hardly any 1argain deals, 1ut a high num1er
of e5pensive h trades. In QI,NR treaments, there are more 1argains and less non-
value driven h deals. E5perience almost completely eliminates these non-value
driven deals, and most trades are of moderate siPe.
Ta1le \ [uanties the informal comparisons of this su1section so far, and
conrms them.
Total li[uidity increases signicantly in policy e5periments, 1ut not Nith e5-
perience. Both measures of trade li[uidity Qa1solute and relativeR shoN higher
investment in 1onds in policy e5periments Qstatistically, the a1solute increase
is clearerR. The focality of the increase, i.e. the reduction of volatility Nith
respect to the share invested across participants, is strongly signicant, Nhereas
only e5perience reduces total trading volume. >inally, the num1er of trades
22
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>igure \a Money in trade account
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>igure 8a Volatility of money in 1ond account
Varia1le Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value Wilco5on p-value
Total li[uidity H0a I,P 3 I,N ".845 Q0.0_\R "."20 Q0."_"R
H0a I,P i E,P 0.285 Q0.\\8R 0.290 Q0.\\2R
Trade li[uidity H0a I,P 2 I,N -2.285 Q0.0"\R -2.05_ Q0.020R
H0a I,P 3 E,P _.88_ Q2"0"4R _.2"5 Q0.00"R
Relative invest- H0a I,P 3 I,N "._08 Q0."0"R ".4_" Q0.0\dR
ment in 1onds H0a I,P 2 E,P -".54" Q0.0d\R -".4_" Q0.0\dR
Variance money H0a I,P 2 I,N -_._"d Q0.00"R -_.d2d Q2"0"4R
in 1onds H0a I,P 2 E,P -0.\\2 Q0.22"R 0.d_0 Q0.2d4R
Trading volume H0a I,P i I,N -0.555 Q0.580R -05_8 Q0.59"R
H0a I,P 3 E,P _.\9\ Q2"0"4R _.4"8 Q2"0"4R
Trades at more H0a I,P 3 I,N ".05d Q0."4dR ".\99 Q0.0_dR
than MWV H0a I,P 3 E,P 5."dd Q2"0"4R 5.\_" Q2"0"4R
Ta1le \a Testing di!erences in distri1ution
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>igure 9a Uevel of non theory-conform trading
2d
at more than MWV also signicantly increases in QI,PR e5periments over QI,NR
e5periments Qclearer 1ased on the Wilco5on statisticR. Both parametric and
nonparametric tests agree that these trades go signicantly doNn Nith e5peri-
ence.
Trading success9 4ll participants start the e5periment Nith the same endoN-
ment of "0 stock and _,d00 :ulden. If they all did e[ually Nell, each participant
Nould oNn 1, % (total li[uidity15) at the end of the e5periment. >igure "0 e5am-
ines this [uestion.
Xlearly, this is not the case. Some people do 1etter than e5pected, some
Norse. More interestingly, the success dependent spread in income distinctly
di!ers in QI,PR and QI,NR marketsa the 1est do 1etter in QI,PR environments, and
the Norst fare Norse. In other Nords, interest policy helps sort out good from
1ad traders. E5perience accentuates this resulta only tNo traders do 1etter
Nith e5perience, si5 do Norse or similar to 1efore, and the e5tent of over -
and underperformance increases. We checked the statistical signicance of the
di!erences using SpearmannSs Rho"0V 1oth di!erences are highly signicant.
3.4.3 A simple model of noise trading
The model We investigate Nhether Ne can capture some of the price dynam-
ics in a simple, heuristic learning model. To this end, Ne develop a model of noise
trading on a stock market. 4s is usual in the literature on this topic Qsee, e.g.,
4Pariadas Q"99_R or Brock, Hommes Q"998RR, Ne assume that some of the traders
are informed traders and 1ase their evaluation of stock prices on fundamental
values. Others are chartists Qor momentum tradersR. We assume that chartists
have adaptive e5pectations. This assumption has a long history in economics
that goes as far 1ack as, to our knoNledge, Irving >isherV it has also 1een found
to correspond Nell to actual price forecasts of participants of prior la1oratory
stock market e5periments Qsee Smith, Suchanek, Williams Q"988RR. Essentially,
adaptive e5pectations descri1e chartists as trend-folloNing. Informed traders
e5pect that stock prices Nill, in the long run, approach fundamental values if
they currently di!er from them.
We noN descri1e the model elements. 4 population of traders deals over 1#
periods in a dividend-1earing stock on a stock e5changeV # is time, inde5ing the
periods, i.e. # ! "1$ 2$ 3$ """$ 1##. *" is the dividend draN in period #. Wividends
are nite-valued and have a nite, discrete distri1ution that is stationary over
time. Uet * .= !""1 &*"' # ! &*"', Nith !""1 resp. ! denoting the conditional
QunconditionalR mathematical e5pectation, Nhich coincide in our market struc-
9We are grateful to Ro1ert Wilson Nho pointed out that it Nas important to investigate
trading success.
"0 SpermanSs Rho is Nhat one o1tains 1y replacing the o1servations 1y their ranks and
then computing SpearmanSs product moment coe#cient on the ranks. 4s usual Nith non-
parametric statistics, its advantage over the Pearson coe#cient is that SpearmanSs Rho is
distri1ution free.
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>igure "0a Success of participants relative to uniformly distri1uted income
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ture."" *" evolves over a trivial ltration of the form &1 = &2 = """&15 = & , &!
1eing natural QminimalR for *!.
We assume risk-neutral traders Nho have common knoNledge of the market
structure. In addition to the stock, there is a risk-free 1ond carrying an interest
of r""2 . 9" ! &0$ 1' is the fraction of informed traders in the population of traders.
We dene tNo measures for the sensitivity of adMustment of informed and of noise
tradersS opinion, #!", #
.
" ! &0$ 1'V the signicance of these tNo parameters Nill 1e
clear in a moment. f" and :" are fundamental resp. actual stock prices in period
#. The fundamental value is calculated from a standard risk-neutral dividend-
discount model. >inally, :23!" , :
23.
" and :
2
" are the price e5pectations for period #
of informed traders, noise traders, and the market overall in period #" 1. >rom
a 1ehavorial point of vieN, these e5pectations are reference levels.
We noN formaliPe the di!erent e5pectations that Ne intuitively descri1ed
a1ovea
:23!" = :""1 + #
!
" (f" " :""1) price e5pectation of informed traders
:23." = :
23.
""1 + #
.
"
%
:""1 " :23.""1
&
price e5pectation of noise traders
>or simplicity, Ne assume that the market e5pectation is Must a Neighted
average of individual e5pectations of the participants. This leads to
:2" = 9":
23!
" + (1"9"):23."
We assume the a1sence of ar1itrage opportunities, i.e. that
:" =
*+ :21"$1
1 + r"
$
Nhere :21"$1 is some price e5pectation for period # + 1 in period #. It is
a matter of simple alge1ra to calculate the e[uili1rium prices in the di!erent
market situations. In a market Nith noise traders and informed traders, i.e.
under the e5pectation :2" , the e[uili1rium price is given 1ya
:#" =
9"$1#
!
"$1f"$1 + (1"9"$1)(1" #."$1)(1 + r""1):#""1 + (1" (1"9"$1)(1" #."$1))*
1 + r" " (1"9"$1)#."$1 "9"$1(1" #!"$1)
,
assuming that the denominator is di!erent from Pero.
Fitting the model to the data It is not possi1le to t the model uni[uely to
the e5perimental data 1ecause there are too many degrees of freedom. Hence, Ne
make some simplifying assumptions. Under common knoNledge of the market
structure, one could claim that the sensitivity of adMustment - the parameters
# - depend only on the fraction of the respective traders in the population.
"">ormally, the conditional e5pectation is a random varia1le, Nhich in our case is concen-
trated on one point, ! !dt".
"2Remark the change in notation for the interest rate from i to r in order to keep it separate
from the letter i that noN indicates informed traders in our economy.
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This amounts to saying that if 80 j of the traders are informed, the market
opinion is that there is a move to fundamental values of 0") % (f" " :""1), Nhich
is counter1alanced 1y a 20 j move 1ased on the change of opinion of chartists,
i.e. of 0"2 % %:""1 " :23.""1&. >ormally, this means
#!" . = 9"
#." . = 1"9"
We can noN t our model to the e5perimental data. We are interested in
checking Nhich assumptions on the parameters of the model have to 1e made
in order to produce the e5perimental outcome and to check Nhether the results
folloN a pattern that is intuitively appealing. One possi1le conMecture has the
percentage of informed traders increase toNards the end of the e5periment,
either 1ecause the participants learn to understand the model 1etter, or simply
1ecause the for a SrationalS solution necessary 1ackNard induction gets easier
over time. Uearning and 1ackNard induction may result from conscious as Nell
as unconscious thinking, along the lines of SimonSs remark that one cannot
]rule out the possi1ility that the unconscious is a 1etter decision-maker than
the conscious.] QSimon Q"955RR.
Uet
"&
9 .= (91$92$ """$915)
" 1e the vector of the proportion of fundamental
traders 1y period. The theoretically market clearing price is then of the form
:# .= "&: ("&9) .=
³
:1(
"&
9)$ :2(
"&
9)$ """$ :15(
"&
9)
´"
. Wenote the o1served mean con-
tract price in e5periment ! 1y '! = %'!1$'!2$ """$'!15&". Stack prices as folloNsa
' = %'1$'2$ """$'.&", Nhere / is the num1er of e5periments 1y treatment, and
: = (:#$ :#$ """$ :#) *+ ,
.-times
)". Uet ; .= (
!#1323444315
&0$ 1' 1e the "5-dimensional unit cu1e.
We estimate
"&
9 using non-linear least s[uares as"_
"&
9 = ,45+/0
"$
5%6
(:" ')" (:" ') .
>igures "" and "2 sum up the results of our estimations.
The results of the no policy QI,NR und QE,NR sessions are roughly as con-
Mectured from rst principles. The proportion of trading due to SrationalS con-
siderations increases over time, either 1ecause participants learn to understand
the model 1etter or 1ecause 1ackNard induction is easier close to the end of
the e5periment. Wespite the negative spike in periods 9 and "0, Ne note the
same 1asic pattern in QE,PR e5periments. Only in QI,PR sessions this pattern
is largely a1sent - remark that all intervention periods are local minima of the
"_Non-linear least s[uares are the simplest form of estimation using the generaliPed
method of moments Q:MMR. :MM proceeds 1y minimiPing a [uadratic form like $ #$
(p" P)t ! (p" P) Q! some positive denite Neighting matri5RV in the case of non-linear least
s[uares ! $ Id Qthe identity matri5R. The form of the asymptotically optimal Neighting ma-
tri5 is Nell-knoNn Qsee Hansen Q"982R or also 4ndreNs Q"99"RR. Economic e5periments usually
Nork Nith small-samples, and so it is dou1tful Nhether the use of an asymptotically optimal
matri5 Nould 1enet the [uality of estimation.
_0
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>igure ""a Implied proportion of SrationalS traders
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>igure "2a Xomparison of implied proportion of SrationalS traders
implied share of rational trading. Something else is curious a1out the QI,PR
treatments"4. The graph of these sessions looks as if three learning cycles suc-
ceed each other. Each 1egins Nith minimal raitonality in an intervention period
Q4, 8, and "2R, after Nhich the implied share of rational traders rises someNhat
until the ne5t intervention. Hence, QI,PR e5periments look as if they consist of
three small, disMoint versions of the results of the other treatments.
3.5 Analysis of the research hypotheses
Conjecture 1a X" predicts that B(I,P)=B(I,N)=B(E,P)=0. Our data
shoN that this is clearly not the case. There are 1u11les 1ased on every measure
Qsee gure _R, and the 1u11le measures do not e[ual Pero Qta1les _ and 4R. We
reMect the hypothesis that !' = !( = 0 on a highly signicant level Qta1le
dR, and even more clearly the hypothesis that all coe#cients are Mointly Pero
Q>-statistic in ta1le dR. Hence, our data strongly refutes conMecture ".
Conjecture 2: Based on gure _, 1u11les are much more pronounced in
ine5perienced treatmentsV the tNo ine5perienced treatments di!er less o1viously
from another. Ta1les _ and 4 [uantify this impression. E5perience reduces all
1u11le measures e5cept for turnover and duration. In addition, volatility, naive
deviation and duration Qon a "5 j levelR signicantly di!er in QI,PR sessions
from QI,NR sessions. Ta1le d reports the results of several tests 1ased on the
regressions Ne conducted. Using this measure, Ne nd only rarely statistically
signicant di!erencesV namely, only the coe#cient of price variance signicantly
di!ers in ine5perienced sessions.
"4Muhamet ZildiP pointed this out to us.
_2
When Ne look at all the evidence for ine5perienced sessions, Ne nd that
interest policy reduces the duration and deviation of 1u11les compared to ses-
sions Nith no interest policyV i.e., Ne have some support for our hypothesis,
although it is not entirely clear. E5perience, on the other hand, is found to
have an unam1iguous e!ecta almost all measures support BQE,PR2BQI,PR and
BQE,NR2BQI,NR.
It is immediately apparent from gure d and ta1le \ that higher interest
rates create additional income Qinvesting into 1onds is more prota1leR. We-
spite of this, gure \ shoNs that there is less money in peopleSs trade accountsk
Qta1le \ conrms that the di!erences are highly signicantR We Nill discuss this
surprising result 1eloN in conMecture 4V for noN Ne Must note that it conforms
Nell Nith conMecture 2. It Nill also 1ecome clear later Nhy the result is not so
surprising after all.
Summing up, Ne have some evidence for conMecture 2.
Conjecture 3a The e5periment clearly documents the increase in price
volatility. 4ll measures, from gure _, ta1le _, ta1le 4, to ta1le d, agreeV in fact,
this is the only di!erence that nds statistically signicant support from the
tests reported in ta1le d.
>igure 9 charts the trading 1ehavior in the respective markets. We o1serve
more trades at more than MWV in QI,PR than in QI,NR sessions Qta1le \ shoNs that
the di!erence is signicant, in particular 1ased on the nonparametric Wilco5on
testR.
4s Ne have mentioned 1efore, trades at h are di#cult to reconcile Nith
theory conform trading. Perfectly rational risk-neutral traders Nith common
knoNledge of the market structure 1ackNard induct, Nhich prevents 1u11les
from happening Qc. conMecture "R. In order to understand these trades from
a SrationalS modeling perspective, Ne have to assume either risk-aversion or a
more comple5 - and hence ad hoc - model structure Qsuch as the e5pectation of
capital gains, or 1oundedly rational players that have computational limits, c.
Ru1instein Q"998RR.
Porter, Smith Q"995R have shoNn that risk-aversion alone does not account
for Nhat are errors in decision making for risk-neutral players Nith common
knoNledge Qtrades at hR. On the other hand, Uei, Noussair, Plott Q200"R have
argued that lack of common knoNledge of rationality alone does not e5plain
the trading 1ehavior either. What a1out computational limits for the playersb
Were they to account for a maMority of non-theory conform trades, Ne Nould
see the folloNing tNo [ualitative patternsa
". The num1er of trades at more than UBV per period Nould go doNn over
time.
2. The share of SrationalS trades Nould go up over time.
>igure 9 shoNs that the rst is very much not the case in our e5periment -
in fact, if anything Ne o1serve the opposite. We can get a rough estimate of the
level of theory-conform trading from our noise trading model. While Ne do nd
__
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>igure "_a Wividend e5cess return
the second pattern in QI,NR e5periments Qand appro5imately in QE,PR e5peri-
ments Qgure ""R, the implied proportion of rational traders in QI,PR treatments
is highly erratic - no systematic pattern e5ists. Note that all three interven-
tion periods - periods 4, 8, and "2 - are local minima of rationality. But it is
not only the pattern Qor lack thereofR of the evolution of the implied share of
rational traders over time that is interestinga e5cept for in one or tNo periods,
the proportion of rational traders is higher in control than in policy treatments
Qgure "2R. We conclude that conMecture _ conforms Nell Nith the data.
Conjecture 4a We have remarked a1ove that it is clear from gure d and
ta1le \ that higher interest rates create additional income Qinvesting into 1onds
is more prota1leRV gure "_ shoNs that higher interest rates also increase the
opportunity costs of holding stock. :iven that the relative value of stocks per
period is loNer in QI,PR e5periments, participants should hold more 1onds as
a share of their portfolio. On the other hand, 1ecause other factors - such as
li[uidity - inuence investment decisions too, and 1ecause total income is higher
in policy treatments, Ne do not a priori knoN Nhether to e5pect a1solutely less
money in their trade accounts. >igure \ shoNs that 1oth are true, ta1le \ that
the di!erence is highly signicant Qa little stronger, surprisingly, for a1solute
than for relative di!erencesR. The change is unanimousa the variance of the
share invested in 1onds goes doNn signicantly from QI,NR to QI,PR e5periments
Qgure 8 and ta1le \R. E5perienced su1Mects recogniPe their opportunities 1etter
Qgures \ and 8 and ta1le \R.
Ta1le 8 shoNs the value impact on Walrasian price adMustment.
In ine5perienced policy sessions, the price process recogniPes an increase in
interest rates. Note that this is less the case in e5perienced sessions. We think
that this is 1ecause participants Nho faced the #7&'( same market situation
_4
Treatment
I,P I,N E,P E,N
Varia1le Rho p-value Rho p-value Rho p-value Rho p-value
E5cess 1ids 0.45" Q2"0"4R 0._5d Q0.00"R 0.5"5 Q0.00"R 0.2\8 Q0.__dR
Volume 0.08d Q0.4_8R -0.050 Q0.d55R 0.05\ Q0.\"8R -0."5d Q0.59\R
Total li[uidity -0.22" Q0.04_R -0."24 Q0.2d2R 0.099 Q0.5_2R 0.04d Q0.8\dR
Trade li[uidity -0.289 Q0.008R 0.2d9 Q0.0"4R 0."_5 Q0._95R 0._28 Q0.25_R
Xhange of ! -0.2_0 Q0.0_5R nfa QnfaR -0."54 Q0.__"R nfa QnfaR
Wiv. e5cess return -0._"4 Q0.004R 0.055 Q0.d"8R 0.5_0 Q2"0"4R -0.209 Q0.4\4R
Ta1le 8a SpearmanSs Rho 1etNeen price change and other varia1les
1efore anticipated changes in interest rates. If they did, prices should have
reected their e5pectation even 1efore the change actually hit the market. The
same ta1le shoNs hoN changes in the dividendfe5cess return"5 inuence market
prices. Because Ne held the interest rate constant in control e5periments, there
is no signicant impact of the dividendfe5cess ratio in QI,NR and QE,NR sessions.
We have anecdotal evidence of the importance of strategic investment de-
cisions that are far from Nhat the 4PH Nould predict. The asset market is
a Pero-sum game, so the optimal decision on a group level Nould have 1een
investment in 1onds Qmoney in trade accounts is - on a group level - money
lost 1ecause it does not carry interestR. In other Nords, it Nould have 1een
SrationalS for the group to keep the stock and invest all cash in 1onds, or from
the vieNpoint of the individual participant to sell the stock for a SgoodS price
and invest the proceeds in 1onds. We identied our 1est tNo traders. In their
QI,PR sessions, they 1ehaved e5actly in this fashiona they sold all their stock for
m and h prices early on, invested the money in 1onds, and leaned 1ack for the
rest of the e5periment. 4s a result, over tNo rounds, they made a1out si5 times
as much money as the Norst participant in their group.
>igure "0 charts the success dependent spreada it increases from QI,NR to
QI,PR treatments Qthe increase is statistically highly signicantR.
Summing up, Ne have ample evidence to support conMecture 4.
Conjecture 5a We have pointed out 1efore hoN conMectures _ and 4 put
the 4PH in dou1t. Xonsider additionally the folloNinga Ne held the e5peri-
enced sessions right after the ine5perienced sessions, on the same day. If the
e5perimental su1Mects actually traded 1ecause they Nere 1ored, the market vol-
ume QturnoverR Nould not 1e signicantly di!erent in the ine5perienced and the
e5perienced sessions. The same applies if they traded 1ecause they QNronglyR
assumed that Ne Nanted them to trade. Ta1le d, hoNever, shoNs that turnover
"5The dividendfe5cess return is dened as
d-et $
E !dt"
Pt"1
" it.
More formally, Pt"1 in the denominator should 1e the conditional price e5pectation in period
t" " for period t. Our formula amounts to assuming static e5pectations.
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goes doNn from QI,PR to QE,PR sessions Qthe di!erence is highly signicantR. 4s
Ne have pointed out 1efore, it is the prot-ma5imiPing strategy to invest all
money in 1onds. If rational traders understand this, or learn it Nith e5perience,
turnover goes doNn. Hence, Ne interpret the decline in trade volume to signal
that participants learned to recogniPe value 1etter in e5perienced session. We
have another hint that trade is not due to the 4PH. If trade Nere due to the
4PH, Ne Nere likely to see investment patterns such as
". Xonstant share of the participantsS portfolio invested in 1onds over time.
2. Xonstant amount of trade li[uidity on the participantsS trade account over
time,
in particular the second. We see neither pattern in our e5periments Qgures
\ and 8, and ta1le dR.
4 Conclusions
The rst conclusion folloNs immediately from the discussion of conMecture " in
section _.5.
Conclusion 1 ?%# 5&(& ,! ,1" #7+#")8#-($ ',-("&5)'( (%# +"#5)'(),-$ ,! $(&-@
5&"5 "&(),-&0)(. 8,5#0$ ,! #',-,8)' (%#,".3
XonMectures _ and 4 imply another conclusiona
Conclusion 2 A-(#"#$( +,0)'. )$ 8,5#$(0. 4#-#')&0 !," (%# $)M# &-5 51"&(),-
,! 41440#$3 O- (%# ,(%#" %&-5C )( $(",-60. )-'"#&$#$ (%# *,0&()0)(. )- (%# $(,'2
8&"2#(3
XonMecture 4 in conMunction Nith conMecture _ also supports another corol-
larya
Conclusion 3 ?%# $(,'2 8&"2#( )$ '%&"&'(#")M#5 4. 5#+&"(1"#$ !",8 ("&5)-6 &(
*&01#$ +"#5)'(#5 4. 4&$)' #',-,8)' 8,5#0$3 ?%# +,"(!,0), 5#')$),- 8,"# 6#-#"&0C
%,B#*#"C )$ ',-$)$(#-( B)(% "&(),-&0 '%,)'#3
In sum, Ne conclude that Nhile it is good to 1e the king Qor 4lan :reenspanR,
it is not easy. When even in a modestly comple5 setting Qsuch as in our e5peri-
mentR it is hard to cali1rate an interest policy that deates 1u11les in a timely
and controlled manner - hoN much more so must this have 1een the case in the
4merican economyb We have some success, 1ut nd ourselves trading-o! the
deation of a 1u11le Nith an increase in market volatility, a certainly undesir-
a1le 1y-product. On the other hand, it is satisfying to see hoN the rationality
of people shines through their portfolio choice. >or real stock markets, it stands
to hope that this self-motivation of value-driven people, together Nith timely
interventions of central 1anks, Nill conceiva1ly manage to do Must as Nell, and
hopefully 1etter, than our e5periment implies in a la1oratory setting.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Figures and tables by experiment
We rst shoN mean contract prices, trade volume and fundamental value for
generic e5periments Nith ine5perienced and e5perienced traders. In the ine5-
perienced case, Ne held tNo sessions at the same time. Both groups faced the
same dividend payments. One Nas su1Mected to interested policyV Ne 5ed the
interest rate at 5 percent for the other. This is Nhy Ne also shoN the results of
these tNo groups in the same graph.
We ne5t plot the 1u11les for all generic e5periments. >or denitions of the
SnaiveS and SsophisticatedS perspective, check section _.".
We then present the same gures for non-generic e5periments. The section
concludes Nith a ta1le of the 1u11le measures 1y e5periment.
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>igure 24a Xomparison of 1u11le measures in generic e5periments Nith interest
policy QIR
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>igure 25a Xomparison of 1u11le measures in generic e5periments Nith interest
policy QIIR
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>igure 2\a Mean contract prices, trade volume, and 1u11les in non-generic
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Bu11le measure
Treat- Wura- Turn- 4mpli- Vola- Wevi- Wevi- Rel.
ment tion over tude tility ationQsR ationQnR 1u11le
I,P
_ 2."" ".20 0."4 ".52 0.94 0.9
_ _.20 ".2_ 0."8 2.25 ".4_ 0.5_
2 5._8 ".0" 0._9 ".\d ".0\ 0.5"
4 2.d9 0.d9 0."5 ".2_ 0.4d 0.44
\ d.d_ ".29 0.29 2.98 2."2 0.d\
" 2.d4 0.\2 0.22 ".\2 0.82 0.50
I,N
2 _.58 0.99 0."4 ".d4 "."2 0.50
d 2.4d 0.9d 0."4 ".\\ ".22 0.45
\ _.0" "._9 0.08 _.4d 2.9" 0.d4
4 4.48 "."0 0.28 ".9\ ".50 0.52
"4 \.2_ 0.9" 0.05 0.80 ".20 0.40
2 _.0" "."5 0."d 2.50 ".88 0.5_
E,P
" 2.40 0.4\ 0."0 0.\\ 0."d 0._4
d 2.\_ 0.\0 0."2 "."\ 0._9 0.55
2 2.5_ 0.\\ 0."2 0.4d 0.89 0.25
E,N
2 2.8_ 0._d 0."0 0.58 0."5 0.2_
Ta1le 9a Bu11les measures 1y e5periment
5.2 The interest rate policy algorithm
The algorithm is Nritten in a pseudo code that resem1les <. KnoNledge of any
programming language should 1e su#cient to read our code.
Pseudo code for interest rate policy
Qdene varia1lesR
oat 9 &1#' fl mean contract prices lf
oat =, &1#' fl fundamental values lf
oat 4 fl 1u11le tolerance, 4> (0$ 1) lf
oat !ra/?e &#' fl possi1le interest rates lf
integer :@!/#er fl pointer to current interest rate lf
oat ! fl current interest rate lf
integer #!+e fl keep track of last intervention lf
Boolean :@A454 fl indicator function for positive 1u11le lf
52
Boolean /e?454 fl indicator function for negative 1u11le lf
QinitialiPe parametersR
4 = 0"#
!ra/?e &1' = 0"01 fl decide on possi1le interest policy lf
!ra/?e &2' = 0"0#
!ra/?e &3' = 0"11
!ra/?e &*' = 0"1#
!ra/?e &#' = 0"21
:@!/#er = 2 fl 1egin Nith ! = 0"0# lf
! = !ra/?e &:@!/#er'
#!+e = 1 fl rst intervention in period 4 Qi"h_R lf
:@A454 = =alAe fl no 1u11les yet lf
/e?454 = =alAe
Qsu1routine raise interest ratesR
1egin su1routine HI:HER
if :@!/#er $ *
:@!/#er = :@!/#er + 1
#!+e = 0 fl intervention has happened
so no more interv. for _ periods lf
endif
end su1routine
Qsu1routine loNer interest ratesR
1egin su1routine UOWER
if :@!/#er % 2
:@!/#er = :@!/#er " 1
#!+e = 0 fl intervention has happened
so no more interv. for _ periods lf
endif
end su1routine
Qmain programR
1egin M4IN
for # = 1 to 1#
read 9 &#' fl get current values lf
read =, &#'
#!+e = #!+e+ 1 fl time since last
intervention has passed lf
5_
Qcheck all 1u11le states and adMustR
if 9 &#' % (1 + 4)=, &#' fl check for pos. 1u11le lf
:@A454 = Cr5e fl positive 1u11le lf
/e?454 = =alAe
if #!+e % * fl at least 4 periods since
last intervention lf
su1routine HI:HER
endif
endif
if 9 &#' $ (1" 4)=, &#' fl check for neg. 1u11le lf
/e?454 = Cr5e fl negative 1u11le lf
:@A454 = =alAe
if #!+e % * fl at least 4 periods since
last intervention lf
su1routine UOWER
endif
endif
if Q:@A454 = Cr5e and 9 &#' % (1" 4)=, &#' and 9 &#' $ =, &#'R
:@A454 = =alAe fl Nas pos. 1u11le -3 no 1u11le lf
su1routine UOWER
endif
if Q/e?454 = Cr5e and 9 &#' $ (1 + 4)=, &#' and 9 &#' % =, &#'R
/e?454 = =alAe fl Nas neg. 1u11le -3 no 1u11le lf
su1routine HI:HER
endif
! = !ra/?e &:@!/#er' fl adMust interest rate lf
ne5t # fl end of this period lf
end M4IN
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5.3 Experimental instructions
OvervieN"d
Zou are noN participating at an economic e5periment that deals Nith trading
in stock markets. Xontingent on your decisions in this e5periment, you can earn
money in e5cess of your participation fee of "0 >ranken"\. Hence, it is important
that you read these instructions very carefully. 4t the end of the document you
nd some [uestions. Please ansNer them and tell us Nhen you are done.
Please refrain from talking for the duration of the experiment. If
you have [uestions, please ask us. If you do not o1serve this rule, Ne Nill have
to e5clude you from this e5periment and all payments, and ask you to leave.
The e5periment consists of "5 periods. The currency of the e5periment is
called :ulden"8, not >ranken. Zou can earn :ulden in each period. We Nill
e5change your :ulden to >ranken at the end of the e5periment, at a rate of
1000 Gulden = 120 Rappen"9
Basic structure of the e5periment
This e5periment is a1out investment of money. Zou can 1uy either stocks
or 1onds. Zou can also trade in stocks. Bonds 1ear interest. Money you use for
trade does not 1ear interest. Each period, stocks pay a dividend.
4t the 1eginning of the e5periment, i.e. at the 1eginning of the rst period,
you receive an endoNment in money and in stocks. Each period is structured
in the same Nay. Zou rst decide hoN much money to put into 1onds and hoN
much money to reserve for trade in stocks. Zou can then trade in stocks, i.e. sell
them to other participants or 1uy them from other participants. Zou can only
use the money you reserved at the 1eginning of the period for trade in stocks.
4fter the trade phase, you receive a dividend for each stock in your possession,
and interest on your 1onds. Zou can use this money and the stocks again in the
ne5t period. Some detailsa
". The dividend: Each stock pays a dividend at the end of every period.
The dividend amount is determined 1y chance. It is either 0, 8, 28 or
d0 :ulden for every stock in your possession at the end of the respective
period. Each amount is e[ually likely and determined in each period Nith
the aid of a dice. In other Nords, on SaverageS Qover many periodsR you
can e5pect to earn 24 :ulden per period per stock in your possession, if
you are lucky d0, and if you are unlucky 0.
2. The interest: Zou receive interest on money invested in 1onds. The
interest rate is 5 j per period originally. It is varia1le Nhich means that
"dThe instructions are translated from :erman.
"\One dollar are a1out ".8 >ranken.
"84 :ulden is a medieval coin.
"9"00 Rappen i " >ranken.
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it is possi1le, 1ut not certain that the interest rate is going to change in
later periods. Zou do not receive interest for money on your trade account.
The accounts
". Stock account: 4t every point in time, this account shoNs the current
num1er of stocks in your possession.
2. Cash accounts:
QaR Trade account: Zou can use the money on this account to 1uy
stocks during the trade phase Qc. periodsR. It does not 1ear interest.
Q1R Bond account: This account contains the money that you declared
as non-trade money for this period. It does 1ear interest.
QcR Total cash: The sum of the previous tNo accounts.
Zour prot
It is very easy to calculate your prot in :ulden Qin addition to the "0
>ranken shoNup feeR. It isa
Money on your total cash account at the end of period "5.
Zou do not receive anything for stock in your stock account at the end of
the e5periment. Wuring the e5periment, you have the folloNing options to make
a prota
". Buying and selling of stocks
2. Wividends on your stocks
_. Interest on cash in 1onds
The periods
". Splitting your cash on the accounts
5d
4t the 1eginning of each period, you receive an overvieN over the current
state of your Nealth Qsee a1oveR. This overvieN speciesa
QaR The average price at Nhich stocks traded in each of the previous
periods.
Q1R The state of your total cash account and your stock account.
QcR The current interest rate that Nill 1e paid in this period on money
in your 1ond account.
On the 1ottom of the page you notice the icon of a calculator. When you
click it, a calculator appears on your screen. Zou can use it for calculations
at this stage of each period.
Zou then have to make a decision 1efore trade in stocks 1eginsa
! Wivide your cash 1etNeen your trade account and your 1ond account.
In the folloNing trade phase of this period, you can use only money
in your trade account to deal in stocks. Zou receive interest on
money in your 1ond account.We added a 1utton Scalculate interestS
to help you translate percentage points into :ulden. When you hit
this 1utton you see, under the 1ond account, the amount in :ulden
you Nould receive at the end of this period at the current interest rate
if you put as much money into the 1ond account as you currently do.
Zou can try out di!erent amounts in your 1ond account and compare
the :ulden they pay you at the end of the period 1efore you continue.
! When you are happy Nith hoN you split your cash on the tNo ac-
counts, rst press the Scalculate interestS 1utton and then the SokS
5\
1utton on your screen. Even if you Nant to pass on the calcula-
tion of interest, you have to rst hit the Scalculate interestS 1utton
and only after that the SokS 1utton. The e5periment sNitches to the
QstockR trade phase of this period once the last participant has hit
the SokS-1utton.
2. The (stock-) trade phase
In each period you have 2 minutes and _0 seconds to trade stocks. Xheck
the trade screen 1eloN. On top is the current period and time remaining.
In the middle of the screen, you see the num1er of stocks in your stock
account and the :ulden in your trade account.
In the loNer part of the screen, you tradea
QaR Zou make sales o!ers to the other participants in the NindoN on
the very left. Enter the price you are asking for in the 1lue eld and
press SsellS. This price appears then on the screen of all participants
right ne5t to this eld, in the eld Ssales o!ers.S Zou can only enter
integer, positive amounts, and your o!er must 1e loNer than the
currently loNest o!er.
Q1R The ne5t NindoN contains the sales o!ers of &00 participants. Zou
can 1uy one stock at one of these prices. The currently 1est o!er
is highlighted. When you hit S1uyS, you automatically 1uy a stock
from the participant Nho made this o!er. The respective amount is
de1ited to your trade account.
QcR The NindoN in the center of the loNer part of the screen lists all
prices at Nhich stocks Nere traded in this period.
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QdR The fourth NindoN contains the price 1ids of &00 participants. Zou
can sell one of your stocks at one of these prices. The 1est 1id
is highlighted. When you hit SsellS, you sell one of your stocks to
the participant Nho made this o!er. The resulting cash amount is
credited to your trade account.
QeR Zou can make an o!er to buy in the NindoN on the very right. Enter
the amount at Nhich you are Nilling to 1uy a stock into the 1lue eld
and hit S1uyS. This price su1se[uently appears on all screens in the
eld So!ers to buy.S Zou can only enter integer, positive amounts,
and your o!er must 1e higher than the currently highest o!er.
Some trade rules for stocks:
! Wo not sell stocks that you do not oNn yet.
! Wo not sell stocks to yourself.
! Wo not 1uy stocks Nith de1t, i.e. you are not alloNed to o!er more for
a stock than you currently have on your ("&5# &'',1-( QZou cannot
access money in your 1ond account for trade in this periodR.
The computer Nill enforce these rules automatically. If ever you are as-
tonished a1out pro1lems Nith the e5ecution of one of your orders, please
check rst Nhether you folloNed these rules.
_. Summary of this period
4t the end of each period, you receive a summary of your prots from
dividends on your stock and interest on money in your 1ond account.
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4dditionally, this summary shoNs the current state of your accounts. Press
the ScontinueS 1utton once you are ready. Xheck the screen shot and the
short description under it.
Line 1: The money you put into your 1ond account at the 1eginning of
this period.
Line 2: Zour prot in :ulden from the interest on the amount from line
".
Line 3: Xash on your trade account at the end of this period, i.e. &!(#"
the stock trade phase.
Line 4: This periodSs dividend Qper stockR.
Line 5: The num1er of stocks you oNn at the end of this period, i.e. &!(#"
the stock trade phase.
Line 6: The product of lines 4 and 5.
Line 7: The sum of lines ", 2, _ and d.20
20The participants Nere then asked to ansNer several [uestions that folloNed the instruc-
tions. Their sole purpose Nas to make sure that the participants had correctly understood
the instructions.
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